Constitutional Law: The Black Armbands Case: Freedom of Speech in the Public Schools by Ware, Russell M.
Marquette Law Review
Volume 52
Issue 4 Winter 1969 Article 13
Constitutional Law: The Black Armbands Case:
Freedom of Speech in the Public Schools
Russell M. Ware
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Russell M. Ware, Constitutional Law: The Black Armbands Case: Freedom of Speech in the Public Schools, 52 Marq. L. Rev. 608 (1969).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol52/iss4/13
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Constitutional Law: The Black Armbands Case-Freedom of
Speech in the Public Schools: In an age of growing student restive-
ness and dissent, the United States Supreme Court in Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District1 has expanded the
applicability of constitutional free-speech guarantees to the public school
setting. The petitioners, 6, 13, and 15 years old, were suspended from
the Des Moines, Iowa, public school system for wearing black arm-
bands to school in violation of a school district rule, which had been
passed in anticipation of such conduct. They had worn the bands to
protest the war in Vietnam and to publicize their desire for an extended
truce. Their complaint against the school officials seeking injunctive
relief and nominal damages 2 was dismissed by the United States Dis-
trict Court,3 which found the regulation to be a reasonable one. The
dismissal was affirmed when the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir-
cuit divided 4-4 on the question. 4 The Supreme Court reversed and
remanded, distinguishing regulations governing the wearing of arm-
bands from those governing the style of dress, the length of hair, or
the conduct of group demonstrations. The Court found the wearing of
armbands to be the type of symbolic act "closely akin to 'pure speech'
which, we have repeatedly held, is entitled to comprehensive protection
under the First Amendment." 5
In the past, the Court has applied other provisions of the First
and Fourteenth Amendments to the teacher-pupil relationship and to
the operation of public educational facilities. The Court has invoked
the First Amendment to invalidate programs of compulsory symbolic
speech and declaration of belief, 6 to prohibit state-fostered religious
exercise,7 and to strike down certain statutory restrictions on private
1393 U.S. 503 (1969).
242 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964) (providing for civil redress for deprivation under
color of law of a right or privilege secured by the Constitution or laws of the
United States).
3258 F. Supp. 971 (S.D. Iowa 1966).
4383 F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1967).
z 393 U.S. at 505-06.
6West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), where a
regulation on compulsory flag saluting as a prerequisite for public school at-
tendance was held invalid as applied to children of Jehovah's Witnesses in
that it "invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose
of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official con-
trol." Id. at 642.
7Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1969) (Arkansas statute forbidding the
teaching of evolution in the public schools held violative of the First Amend-
ment, which was said to prohibit a state from tailoring curricula to promote
any particular religious dogma) ; Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (daily
classroom invocation of God's blessing held inconsistent with the "Establish-
ment of Religion" clause of the First Amendment) ; Illinois ex rel. McCollum
v. Board of Educ. of School Dist. No. 71, 333 U.S. 203 (1948) ("released
time" program, whereby school children were relieved of the legal duty to
attend school upon condition that they receive religious instruction in the




school curricula.8 In addition, the Court has found associational free-
dom to be offended by an overly inclusive faculty loyalty oath9 and, by
a requirement of disclosure of every associational tie as a condition for
school employment.10 Mere membership in a subversive group has been
held to be a constitutionally insufficient justification for dismissal of a
public school teacher." Recently, in Pickering v. Board of Education,'12
the Court upheld and clarified-the right of a teacher to publicly criticize
school board policy. Tinker represents the application of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments to the symbolic speech of a public elementary
school student.
The various constitutional provisions involved in the school cases
were applied in a number of different ways. While the First Amend-
ment bar to establishment of religion was held to be absolute, 13 other
provisions were clearly being applied "in light of the special character-
istics of the school environment."' 4 For example, the need for harmony
among co-workers and the need for maintenance of a good working
relationship with immediate superiors have been held to be valid con-
siderations in determining whether a teacher's dismissal for criticizing
the school board is a violation by the state of the teacher's freedom of
speech.15 But Tinker goes further. Tinker not only recognizes the spe-
cial needs of the school environment (here it is a need'for discipline
and decorum) but also indicates the weight to be given such considera-
tions, and formulates a test to be applied when free speech of students
conflicts with school policy. The Court adopted the language of Burn-
side v. Byars,' which the lower court had specifically declined to ac-
cept, and held:
Certainly where there is no finding and no showing that en-
gaging in the forbidden conduct would "materially and substan-
tially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline
in the operation of the school," the prohibition cannot be sus-
tained. Burnside v. Byars, 33 F.2d at 749.17
s Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (a freedom to acquire knowledge
was said to be included in the "liber ty protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment); Bariels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404 (1923).
9 Weiman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) (the failure to, distinguish between
knowing and innocent membership in offensive organizations held violative of
due process).
10 Shelton v. rucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1959).
"1 Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (intent to further un-
lawful aims held to be prerequisite for firing). See also Whitehill v. Ellins,
389 U.S.'54 (1967) ; Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964) ;' Cramp v. Board
of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S.'278 (1961).
-2391 U.S. 563 (1968).
13 Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97. (1969).
14 393 U.S. at 506.
IS Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 570 n.3.
16 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966).
17 393 U.S. at 509.
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Perhaps the greatest significance of Tinker is its evidence of a
judicial willingness to scrutinize public school disciplinary regulations
for constitutional validity, and to measure the regulations in such terms
as to give in-school activities constitutional protection comparable to
that given activities conducted off the school premises. "It can hardly
be argued," the Court said, "that either students or teachers shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the school-
house gate."' 8 Specifically, the notion that small disruptions are a price
willingly paid to protect pure speech was clearly seen as just as ap-
plicable to the school environment as it is to society as a whole.
Justice Black, in dissenting, felt the decision was a usurpation of
discretionary authority of school officials "wholly without constitutional
reasons."' 9 Curiously, though, he rested much of his criticism on the
grounds that the Court "is resurrecting the old reasonableness-due
process test. ' 20 He claimed that "[T]he doctrine that judges have
the power to hold laws unconstitutional upon the belief of judges that
they 'shock the conscience' or that they are 'unreasonable,' 'arbitrary,'
'irrational,' 'contrary to fundamental "decency,"' or some other flexible
term without precise boundaries" 21 has been rejected. He cited Fergu-
son v. Skrupa22 for a history of the doctrine and a clear statement of
its demise.22 Yet the cases cited by Justice Black dealt not at all with
the freedom of speech, but with social and economic legislation.24 His
call for judicial modesty in this area therefore seems untenable, at least
insofar as he relies on Ferguson for authority.25
Is Id. at 506.
19 Id. at 525.
201d. at 520.
21 Id. at 519-20.
22373 U.S. 726 (1963).
23393 U.S. at 519: "Ferguson v. Skrupa.. . was able to conclude in 1963: 'There
was a time when the Due Process Clause was used to strike down laws which
were thought unreasonable, that is, unwise or incompatible with some particu-
lar economic or social philosophy.
The doctrine that prevailed in Lochner [Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S.
45 (1905)], Coppage [Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915)], Adkins (Adkins
v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923)], Burns [Jay Burns Baking Co.
v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504 (1924)], and like cases-that due process authorizes
courts to hold laws unconstitutional when they believe the legislature has
acted unwisely-has long since been discarded.'"24 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), overturned laws setting maximum
hours of work in bakeries; Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915), concerned
the outlawing of "yellow dog" contracts; Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261
U.S. 525 (1923), concerned women's minimum wage laws; Jay Burns Baking
Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504 (1924), dealt with a law fixing the weight of
loaves of bread.
25 The judicial modesty shown in the review of economic legislation has clearly
not been accepted as proper in the First Amendment field. "The rational con-
nection between the remedy provided and the evil to be curbed, which in other
contexts might support legislation against attack on due process grounds, will
not suffice. These rights rest on firmer foundation." Thomas v. Collins, 323
U.S. 516, 530 (1945). For a list of cases discussing this "preferred position"
[Vol. 52
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But has there been a change in the amount of discretion given local
officials in the operation of the schools, as Justice Black contends?
This case, standing alone, has probably not unduly lessened it. Note
that Tinker involved the reasonable anticipation of a level of disrup-
tion insufficient to warrant curtailment of speech.2 6 A companion case
to Burnside (and one which the Supreme Court cited), 27 Blackwell v.
Issaquena County Board of Education,28 in which the Court of Appeals
upheld a curb on symbolic speech, involved punishment for button-
wearing where substantial disruption was already occurring. How
closely the Court would examine a school official's prediction that a
clearly serious disorder would occur unless a free-speech curb were
imposed is therefore still unclear. The opinion goes no further than
to imply that such anticipation need only be not unreasonable. 29 How-
ever, if, as Tinker holds, a tiny disrjiption will not warrant invasion
of a right as fundamental as freedom of speech, it seems but a small
and logical step to conclude that an official's prediction of material
disruption must include a showing of more than a mere possibility of
such disturbance. There seems no reason why the "likelihood" or
"imminence" of the disruption is not deserving of a measure as rigorous
as that which tests the size of the disturbance. Should that step be
taken, the discretion exercised by school administrators very clearly
would be lessened. If a regulation can be sustained by merely a not
unreasonable fear of some type of disruption, only a patently arbitrary
rule would ever come under judicial scrutiny. The test of which Tinker
may supply the first half, however, could only be applied by an inde-
pendent examination of the facts surrounding the official's exercise of
discretion.
It is interesting to speculate about the applicability of Tinker to
future controversies.3" It can be foreseen that the Court will be called
upon to decide whether other liberties claimed to be protected under
the Bill of Rights and Fourteenth Amendment are entitled to protection
in the public school setting as comprehensive as that given free speech
of the freedom of speech, see Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 90-94 (1949)(concurring opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
20258 F. Supp. at 973: "It was not unreasonable in this instance for school
authorities to anticipate that the wearing of armbands would create some
type of classroom disturbance." (emphasis added).
27393 U.S. at 505 n.l.
28363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966).
29 393 U.S. at 514: "As we have discussed, the record does not demonstrate any
facts which might reasonably have led school authorities to forecast substantial
disruption of or material interference with school activities, and no disturb-
ances or disorders on the school premises in fact occurred."
.o Even before Tinker, a District Court in the Fifth Circuit had held the "ma-
terial and substantial disruption" standard of Burnside to be applicable to
speech at a state college. Dickey v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 273 F. Supp.
613 (D.C. Ala. 1967). Tinker has been applied in a case concerning an anti-
war advertisement in a high school paper. Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F. Supp. 102(S.D. N.Y. 1969).
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by Tinker. The validity of hair length regulations, for example, has
already been challenged in lower federal courts and has given rise to
a clear conflict of opinions. A recent decision giving constitutional
protection to a student's distinctive hair style is Breen v. Kahl.31 That
case rejected two other recent decisions, Ferrell v. Dallas Independent
School District32 and Davis v. Firment33 which, on facts similar to
Breen, found hair length regulations constitutionally permissible. Breen
did not pass on the question of whether long hair was a form of "ex-
pression" entitled to First Amendment protection, 34 but instead found
the right to choose one's personal appearance to be one of those con-
stitutional rights which are unenumerated but implicit in the Bill of
Rights.3 5
What effect will Tinker have on the resolution of such a question?
An argument that Tinker reinforces the Breen holding would en-
counter the hurdle of getting Supreme Court recognition of personal
appearance as a constitutionally protected right. 36 Nevertheless, the de-
grees of protection given the rights involved in both Tinker and Breen
were much the same. Tinker demanded a showing of a "material and
substantial disruption," while Breen held that school regulations cur-
tailing a constitutional right must bear "a substantial burden of justi-
fication,"37 and that those regulations are valid only if the distraction
they prevent is "aggravated ... frequent . . .general . . . [and] per-
sistent." 8
31296 F. Supp. 702 (W.D. Wis. 1969).
32392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1968).
3269 F. Supp. 524 (E.D. La. 1967).
3a Both Ferrell and Davis held that even if wearing a distinctive hair style
were seen as a form of expression, the regulations they reviewed were valid.
However, the reasoning of neither court on this point seems compelling. Ferrell
applied Burnside v. Byars to give a protection seemingly less rigorous than
that given to free expression by. the Supreme Court in Tinker. The Court of
Appeals' analysis of Burnside and Blackwell omitted any mention of the need
for a showing of "material and substantial disruption." Davis, citing Cox v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965), said that the expression involved was not
"pure," and so upheld the regulation. Yet what Cox was distinguishing from
"pure" speech was "conduct such as patrolling, marching, and picketing."
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555. A distinctive haircut, if it is expression,
seems far more like an armband than like 'a demonstration.
35 The District Court's reasoning in overturning the suspensions can be sum-
marized as follows: (1) the right of an adult to present himself to the world
as he pleases is a highly protected freedom and therefore any restriction on
it must carry a "substantial burden of justification," 296 F. Supp. at 706; (2)
a high school student is entitled to similar constitutional protection, Id. at 708;
and (3) there was too little evidence of distraction of others or impairment
of the performance of the non-conformists to carry the substantial burden of
justification, Id. at 709.
36 The District Court in Breen cited Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965), for the proposition that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights
have penumbras formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give
them life and substance," Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 484, and held
freedom of appearance to be such a penumbral right. Breen v. Kahl, 296
F. Supp. 702, 705-06.
37 Breen v. Kahl, 296 F. Supp. 702, 706.
38 Id. at 709.
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These decisions haye been couched in terms of the proper scope of
judicial review and may have considerable impact on the public school
scene. Where school disciplinary regulations directly curtail highly pro-
tected personal rights, no presumption of constitutionality will obtain.
Each regulation, when challenged, will be subject to close judicial ex-
amination with the burden of proof on school authorities to show com-
pelling reasons for the rules.3 9
RUSSELL M. WARE
39Justice Harlan, dissenting, objected to placing the burden on the school of-
ficials. "I would, in cases like this, cast upon those complaining the burden
of showing that a particular school measure was motivated by other than
legitimate school concerns ... " 393 U.S. 503, 526 (dissenting opinion).
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